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FISCAL MONITORING IN THE
EURO-AREA
Since the introduction of the Euro, monetary poli-
cy has been centralised while fiscal and wage poli-
cies have not. For fiscal policy, however, the
Stability and Growth Pact of 1997 (Maastricht
Treaty) sets up a monitoring and intervention
mechanism that aims at reducing budget deficits
and public debt levels in order to support (or at
least not to counteract) the monetary policy mea-
sures of the European Central Bank. This mecha-
nism rests essentially on three pillars, which are
described in the table:
– A medium-term early warning mechanism
(Stability Programmes),
– a short-term system for monitoring the imple-
mentation of the Stability Programmes
– and an Excessive Deficit Procedure.
Early Warning Mechanism
1. Annual submission (before 1
March) of "Stability Pro-
grammes" (Euro countries) and
of "Convergence Programmes"
(non-Euro EU member) to
ECOFIN Council, to EFC and
to EC.
Content (for both types of pro-
grammes):
! medium-term development of
budgetary position; target ac-
cording to "Pact": close to
balance or in surplus
! main underlying assumptions
! relevant budgetary and other
economic policy measures
! sensitivity analysis of changes
in the main economic as-
sumptions
! coverage of preceding, current
and at least 3 following years.
2. EC and EFC elaborate (sepa-
rately) assessments of the pro-
grammes.
3. ECOFIN Council examines - on
the basis of these assessments
and within at most 2 months
after submission of the pro-
gramme
! whether the medium-term
budget objectives provide for
a safety margin to avoid an
excessive deficit
! whether the assumptions are
realistic
! whether the measures are
sufficient.
4. If ECOFIN Council considers
that the objectives and contents
of a programme should be
strengthened, the Council "shall
... invite the member state con-
cerned to adjust its pro-
gramme." (1466/97; Art. 5,2)
Implementation of the Stability
Programmes




data by member states to
EC.
2. EC and EFC examine
(separately) budgetary data,
whether they comply with
budgetary discipline, i.e.
whether there is (a risk of)
an excessive deficit.
Two cases of "budgetary
discipline"
! Budget deficit < 3 %
and: debt < 60 % or
sufficiently diminishing or
approaching the reference
value (60%) at a satis-
factory pace
! Budgetdeficit > 3 %,
but: the deficit is not
regarded as excessive, be-
cause it is exceptional and
temporary and close to
the reference value
and: debt ratio is suffi-
ciently diminishing or ap-
proaching the reference
value at a satisfactory
pace
3. If the EC sees (risk of) an





1. If there is (a risk of) an excessive
deficit, ECOFIN Council is in-
formed by EC and EFC.
2. ECOF IN  Co un cil  (1 1   euro -a rea 
cou n tries  +   4  no n-euro -a rea   co un -
tries;  togeth er  87   vo tes)
a) d  eci des b  y
q ua lifi ed   ma jo rity  (i.e.  2/3   o f  8 7)
wh  ether t he d  eficit i s excessive o  r
n ot. 
3. If the deficit is held to be excessive,
recommendations (not published)
are made to the member state
concerned.
4. ECOFIN Council assesses the
effectiveness of the measures an-
nounced by the member state.
5. If the measures are regarded as
ineffective or not implemented,
ECOFIN Council may make its
recommendations public and give
notice to take own measures.
6. If the excessive deficit persists -
due to non-implementation or de-
spite implementation - ECOFIN
Council applies sanctions on the
member state concerned.
7. Sanctions will consist in a non-
interest bearing deposit of 0.2 %
of GDP (fixed component) + a
variable component of 1/10 of the
difference between factual deficit/
GDP and the reference value
(3%). 0.5 % of GDP is the upper
limit for the deposit. The deposit
might be converted into a fine if
the excessive deficit has not been
corrected within 2 years.
a) Number and distribution of votes
will change on 1 January 2005
according to article 3 of the en-
largement protocol adopted in
2001 at Nice.
Notes: EC: European Commission; EFC: Economic and Financial Committee; ECOFIN Council: Council
of Ministers of Economic and Financial Affairs.
Source: CESifo on the basis of the "Stability and Growth Pact", June 1997.
Fiscal Monitoring in the Euro Area: Three PillarsThe institutions charged with implementing the
monitoring and intervention system are the
European Commission (EC), the Economic and
Financial Committee and the ECOFIN Council.
The European Central Bank plays an important
role in critically analysing the most recent versions
of the Stability Programmes as well as the most
recent budgetary performance of the euro-area
countries.
From the outset of the Maastricht Treaty, econo-
mists have criticised the narrow, inflexible and
unclear definition of “budgetary discipline”.
According to the Treaty, budgetary discipline (see
table) may not exist with a budget deficit of less
than the famous 3 percent of GDP,but it may  exist
with a budget deficit that is higher than 3 percent.
The latter case depends on whether the deficit is
regarded as not “excessive”, namely exceptional,
temporary and close to 3 percent. Thus, business
cycle fluctuations are taken into consideration by
the Treaty,but in a poorly defined manner.Instead,
one should consider the cyclically adjusted (or
structural) budget deficit.
The – more or less informal – consensus that has
now been formed in Europe relates the 3 percent
budget deficit rule to the cyclically adjusted bud-
get. That means: if the total deficit (e.g. due to a
business cycle downswing) exceeds the 3 percent
limit but the structural deficit does not, the deficit
is not regarded as excessive.
However, some countries, like France and
Germany, experience even structural budget
deficits which have been in 2002 at around 3 per-
cent (total deficit of around 3.7 percent). A con-
sensus in Europe has been reached that in such
cases an excessive deficit procedure can only be
avoided if the structural deficit is reduced by at
least 0.5 percentage points per year.
The current period of weak growth in several
European countries shows that the past efforts and
achievements – during better times – in reducing
the budget deficits have not been courageous
enough to provide sufficient leeway for counter-
acting a business cycle downswing.
For further information see DICE Database, espe-
cially the following tables:
Fiscal Monitoring in the Euro Area: Procedure
with an Excessive Deficit;
Stability Programmes and Stability Performance of
the Euro Member States;
Cyclically Adjusted Net Lending or Net Borrowing
in Europe.
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